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England, where a new Homicide Act' has just
been passed, has a reputation for splendid murders.
Out of its mild, damp climate has sprung a crop of
celebrated killers, peculiarly horrifying in their
depravity. When such raw material is fed into the
magnificent process of the English criminal trial it
is very natural that the English murder should
have acquired an international audience. But
- never has there been such a pitch of public interest
in homicide as in the last ten years in Britain. One
reason for this has been the concentration of
hideously sensational killings-the convictions and
executions of Heath, the sexual killer; Haigh, who
killed for money and dissolved his victims in an
acid bath; Christie, who with his mild manner but
inexorable purpose made a long career of murdering lonely women; and the psychopath, Straffen,
who escaped from a criminal lunatic asylum and
killed a child. Then there have been the feverish
but unsuccessful agitations for a reprieve from
execution for the youthful robber, Bentley, and for
the tormented Mrs. Ellis who in a paroxysm of
jealousy shot her lover dead. The executions of
Bentley and Mrs. Ellis, together with the discovery that it was, to say the least, possible that
Christi& had committed a murder for which
another man had earlier been hanged 2 sent a wave
15 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11. General Discussions of the
new statute are to be found in ARMITAGE, The Homicide
Act, 1957, CAMBRIDGE L. J. (1957) 183; ELLIOTT, The
Homicide Act, 1957, CRIMINAL L. REv. (1957) 282;
FIELD FISHER, The Homicide Bill, 106 F. J. 788 (1956);
HALL WILLIAMS, The Homicide Bill 9, HOWARD JOURNAL
285 (1957); HAL. WILLIAMS, Legislation: The Homicide
A c, 1957, 20 MODERN L. REv. 381 (1957); PREVEZER,

The English Homicide Act: A New Attempt to Revise
the Law of Murder, 57 COLUm. L. REv. 624 (1957).

2-See

EDDOWES, THE MAN ON YOUR CONSCIENCE

(1955).
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of uneasiness through the British public about the
operation of the death penalty.
Side by side with this surfeit of slayings there
have been continuous agitation and two unsuccessful attempts by the House of Commons to abolish capital punishment. In 1948, the Labor majority in the House, acting against the advice of its
cabinet, included a measure for the abolition of
capital punishment in the Criminal Justice Act.3
The House of Lords, exercising its constitutional
privilege, vetoed that clause, but for a few months,
before the Lords' veto was pronounced, the
capital sentence was in fact not executed in England. The constitutional embarrassment created
by this lordly evasion of the vote of the popular
assembly was glossed over by the Government's
appointing the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment, which produced in 1953 its brilliant
and now celebrated Report.4 The mandate of the
Royal Commission had expressly confined its jurisdiction to review of the possibilities of modifying
the law of murder with respect to the liability to
suffer the death penalty. The Commission took
this to mean that they were precluded from a
frank expression of opinion on the merits of total
abolition, 5 but most critics have viewed the vast
body of evidence assembled and the luminous discussions offered by the Commission as indicating
that there is no convincing proof of the effectiveness of capital punishment as a deterrent to
homicide. In any event a Government motion in
1956 for the retention of the death penalty was
11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 58.
4REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL

1949-1953, Cmd. 8932. hereafter referred
to as REPORT OF THE R. C.C.P.
5
REPORT OF THE R. C.C.P., par. 13.
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surprisingly defeated in the House of Commons, 6
now with a Conservative majority, and this was
followed later in the year by the successful passage
in the Commons of a private member's bill, introduced by Mr. Silverman, for 7the abolition of
capital punishment for homicide.
Once again the Lords vetoed the bill, exercising
their undoubtedly lawful powers of delay and
obstruction in a way which scandalized a large
section of public opinion. The twice expressed will
of the popularly elected Commons could not for
long be flouted in this way. The most proper solution would have been for the Government to have
given time in the Commons for the reintroduction
of the abolition bill, thus nullifying the Lords'
veto which can be overturned by such a proceeding.
This the Government would not do but instead
introduced a compromise bill, limiting capital
punishment in effect to six special cases of murder.
It was this bill which became law in March, 1957,
as the Homicide Act.
SCOPE OF THE

ACT

The half-way measure in the new Act with respect to capital punishment is a compromise that
cannot fully please either the convinced retentionist or the passionate abolitionist. It is a compromise that may indeed in the next few years be
swept away by total abolition. But the importance
of the Act goes far beyond this temporary truce.
For the new Act joins with the restriction of the
death penalty the passage of several important
reforms in the law of murder which had been the
subject of discussion by the Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment.
The conceptual nature of the crime of murder
is a subject that cannot be profitably debated
without constant reference to the penalty. There
can be no doubt that it was the inexorably open
arms of death waiting to receive the convicted
murderer that gave such passionate bitterness to
the attacks on the law of homicide in England. 8
Although for purposes of exposition the portions
of the Act dealing with reforms in the substantive
law of murder must be severed from the sections
dealing with the restriction of the death penalty, a
constant mental cross-reference will be necessary
to appreciate the full impact of the new legislation.
584 HousE OF CoMMoNs DEBATES 2536, 2655.
1 The history of these matters is given more fully
by PREVEZER op. Cit. supra note 1.
8See e.g. KOESTLER,

(1957).

REFLECTIONS ON HANGING

FELONY -M1-RDER

§ I (1). Where a person kills another in the
course or furtherance of some other offence,
the killing shall not amount to murder unless
done with the same malice aforethought
(express or implied) as is required for a killing
to amount to murder when not done in the
course or furtherance of another offence.
§ 1 (2). For the purposes of the foregoing
subsection, a killing done in the course or for
the purpose of resisting an officer of justice,
or of resisting or avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, or of effecting or assisting an
escape or rescue from legal custody, shall be
treated as a killing in the course or furtherance
of an offence.
This section is, of course, designed to abolish the
felony murder rule as it operated in England.
Before the Homicide Act the scope of the felony
murder rule was not entirely clear in England. It
was commonly said that it did not apply to killings
or deaths caused in the course of the commission
of any felony, but only to deaths in the course of
felonies of violence.9 But the significance of violence
here was obscure. It was thought to mean that the
felony must be one which by its very nature involved violence to the person, as rape, but this
view was discredited by the then Lord Chief justice, Lord Goddard, who was willing to apply the
rule to a case of larceny in a dwelling house. 10 As a
matter of fact, however, the rule had little currency in England outside cases in which there
was an actual use of violence in the perpetration of a felony, its operative effect being to impose liability for murder where death ensued after
the use of such violence as might not be sufficient
to show the malice demanded in cases where there
was no involvement in a felony. The rule was thus
in England little more than a useful auxiliary
weapon, invoked in cases where there was an actual use of violence but -where an intention to kill or
cause grievous bodily harm could not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. One might go further than
this and say that the cases in which the felony murder rule operated to secure a conviction where the
verdict must have been different in the absence of
the rule were very few indeed.
Occasionally the harsh case came up. The
strongest example of the rule in operation in Eng9

REPORT ON THE R.C.C.P., pars. 80-90.
10REPORT Or Tix R.C.C.P. par. 100 and Reg. v.
Grant 38 Cam. APP. REP. 107 (1954).
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land is perhaps the case of Jarmaih in 1945.u
There the defendant had held up the cashier of a
filling station at the point of a gun. The gun went
off and the cashier was killed. The accused's story
was that the gun had gone off accidentally while
he was changing it from one hand to the other.
The trial judge had directed the jury that even if
the accused's story were true, he would still be
guilty of murder, because he had killed in the
course of a felony of violence (the violence here
being presumably the assault involved in the
levelling of a gun). The Court of Criminal Appeal
confirmed this view of the law and upheld the convictionPu But there has never been any suggestion
in the English courts that the felony murder rule
might be pushed to cover the accidental death of
an accomplice or the accidental slaying of a spectator by a bullet from a policeman's gun, as the
courts have held or suggested in at least one
American jurisdiction." The only extension of the
rule which was to be found in England is the situation
now covered by §1 (2) of the Homicide Act supra,
a killing in the course of resisting an officer of the
law or while resisting a lawful arrest. But again
this provision had very little impact on the English
law of homicide. It certainly did not seem that a
modern court would have taken it to cover the
extreme case of the police officer who, while chasing
the escaping defendant, trips and breaks his neck.
The very few modem cases on this point of law in
England made it clear that the rule only applied
when real violence was used against the arresting
officer. 14 Its effect was therefore limited, as with
the major branch of the felony-murder rule, to
ensuring a conviction for murder in the case where
the violence used might fall short of that necessary
to make out a convincing case of ordinary malice.
However restricted these rules were in their
operation, they are now gone in England. Following the recommendation of the Royal Commission
on Capital Punishment 5 the Homicide Act has
swept felony murder into the bin of history. But
the statutory language used in effecting this abolition has itself posed a grave problem of interpretation for the English courts. The marginal note to
§ 1 (1) runs "Abolition of 'constructive malice' ",
"131 CRirM. APP. REP. 39 (1945).
12 But Jarmain was reprieved.
11See Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113
A.2d 464 (1955).
" Reg. v. Porter 12 Cox CRmI. CAsEs 444 (1873):
R. v. Appleby 28 Calm. APP. REP. 1 (1940), discussed
in REPORT Op =HE
R.C.C.P. par. 79 and Appendix
7 (b).
IsREPORT Op TEr R.C.C.P., pars. 121-123.

and the language of § 1 (1) itself says that a killing
shall not amount to murder "unless done with...
malice aforethought (express or implied)". Before
the Act, "constructive malice" or "implied malice"
were often used interchangeably to refer to felony
murder. Now it appears that constructive malice is
the correct term to use in this connection, and
implied malice remains a live possibility in the law
of murder. If implied malice can still hang a man
it is well to know precisely what it is. In this way
the Homicide Act has indirectly forced the English
courts to come out with a review of the nature of
the mens rea of murder which, astonishingly as it
might seem, was not at all a clear topic before the
Act.
An intention to kill a human being has always
dearly amounted to a sufficient malice (express).
So too has the doing of an act inherently very
likely to cause death but without proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of a desire to bring about death.
This foresight of the high possibility of death without a desire to cause it reveals a recklessness
towards the taking of life that the common law
has always been willing to regard as an sufficient
malice. But beyond this there has often been talk
in the common law of an intention to cause grievous
bodily harm as being a sufficient mens rea for murder, if death ensues. 6 A great deal turns here on
the meaning of "grievous bodily harm." If taken to
refer only to the kind of harm of which death is a
very possible or probable result, then it adds nothing to the category of recklessness. But, if it means
something less than this, then it adds a good deal
and becomes in itself a sort of additional variety
of constructive murder. The drawing of sharp
lines and clear distinctions in this field had been
successfully avoided by the English courts until
the Homicide Act, with its clear contrasts between
constructive and implied malice on the one hand
and express and implied malice on the other hand,
made such a disentanglement inevitable. The case
in which the matter came to a head was Reg. v.
7

Vickers.1

TnE

VICKERS CASE

The accused had broken into a house to commit
a burglary and had been discovered by the householder, a woman of seventy-two. He struck her
many blows, apparently to prevent her recognizing
him, and there was some evidence, though the
accused denied it, that he had kicked her in the
"sIbid. pars. 470-475.
17[19571 3 W.L.R. 326
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face. The woman died as a result of the attack,
though the medical evidence was that the injuries
suffered by her could have been inflicted with only
a moderate degree of violence. The trial judge had
directed the jury that the accused was guilty of
murder if he had struck the woman with an intention to do her grievous bodily harm. "Murder",
said the judge "is with the intention to kill or to do
grievous bodily harm ... Malice will be implied,

[Vol. 49

of a burglary would amount to murder if death
ensued. If, therefore, the accused, as the trial judge
had rightly pointed out to the jury, had killed the
woman "without intending her any harm, or only
trifling harm" (the Lord Chief Justice's example
of this was "a push to get her out of the way") he
1
would have been guilty of manslaughter only.2
But if he intended to cause her grievous bodily
harm it was murder, for "the 'furtherance of some
other offence' must refer to the offence he was
committing or endeavouring to commit other than
the killing, otherwise there would be no sense in

if the victim was killed by a voluntary act of the
accused-and here is the importance of what I am
going to say-done with the intention either to
kill or to do some grievous bodily harm. The griev- it".n The court summed up its opinion in the folous bodily harm need not be permanent, but it lowing passage: "Murder is, of course, killing 'With
must be serious, and it is serious or grievous if it malice aforethought, but 'malice aforethought' is a
is such as seriously and grievously to interfere with term of art. It has always been defined in English
law as, either an express intention to kill, as could
the health or comfort of the victim."'18
The accused was convicted of murder and ap- be inferred when a person, having uttered threats
pealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal. The main against another, produced a lethal weapon and
ground of the appeal was the contention that caus- used it on a victim, or implied, where, by a voluning grievous bodily harm is in itself a separate tary act, the accused intended to cause grievous
offence and that by virtue of § I (1) of the Homicide bodily harm to the victim and the victim died as
the result. If a person does an act which amounts
Act killing in the course of another offence is not
per se murder. Therefore, the accused argued, the to the infliction of grievous bodily harm he cannot
necessary malice aforethought for murder must be say that he only intended to cause a certain degree
established independently from an intention to of harm. It is called malum in se in the old cases
cause grievous bodily harm which is merely the and he must take the consequences. If he intends
mens rea of another and lesser offence. The Court to inflict grievous bodily harm and that person
of Criminal Appeal, sitting as usual with three dies, that has always been held in English law, and
judges, did not reach unanimity on its first hearing was at the time this Act was passed, sufficient to
of the case and the Lord Chief Justice accordingly imply the malice aforethought which is a necessary
'
summoned a fuller court of five judges, as is some- constituent of murder." "
times done in England when it is felt that the case
The Homicide Act has thus compelled the Enginvolves a point of exceptional importance. 9 This lish courts to embark on a clarification of the mens
fuller court reached unanimity and in a judgment rea of murder at common law. The nature of the
delivered by the Lord Chief Justice the directions clarification in the Vickers case is, however, one
of the trial judge were upheld. The Court regarded that has called down a good deal of criticism. The
judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal has been
the matter as having been "thoroughly explored"
and expected their decision to be a "guidance to strongly assailed in a paper by one of England's
0
leading jurists of the criminal law, Mr. J. W. Cecil
courts in the future".
The flaw in the appellant's argument was, the Turner' 4 Mr. Turner objects in the first place to
court felt, that the "furtherance of some other the court's easy dismissal in the Vickers case of the
offence" mentioned in Section 1 (1) of the Homi- argument that causing grievous bodily harm is
cide Act must refer in the circumstances of this itself an offence and that therefore the proof of
case to the burglary and not to the causing of killing in the course of this offence cannot by virtue
grievous bodily harm. Thus the effect of the statute of the Homicide Act amount per se to murder. In
was that not all acts of violence done in the course Mr. Turner's view this argument has a good deal
18At 330.
'9The English Court of Criminal Appeal consists of
any three judges of the Queen's Bench Division, usually
including the Lord Chief Justice who acts as President.
But the Court may consist of any uneven number of
judges.
20 [1957] 3 W.L.R. at 327-328.

" At 330.
"2At 329.
"At 328.

Mfalice Implied and Constructive, CRINsL. REv. (1958) 15. Mr. Turner repeats his argument in his latest (17th) edition of KENNY'S OUTLINES
or CRmIMNAL LAW (1958), 148-154.
24TURNER,

NAL
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to commend it and the court's dismissal of it seems
to him to amount almost to saying "a felonious
assault constitutes implied malice because it is not
'some other offence' and it is not some other offence
because it constitutes implied malice. '25 Again
Mr. Turner is disturbed by the dear implication in
the Vickers case that the meaning of "grievous
bodily harm" as a test for the mens rea of murder
is identical with its meaning in the felony of causing
grievous bodily harm under the Offences Against
the Person Act of 1861,26 i.e., as the trial judge told
the jury in the Vickers case, a harm that need not
be permanent, but must seriously interfere with the
health or comfort of the victim. If this is so, Mr.
Turner believes that as a result of the Vickers case
"the law of murder has now been made more
severe than in effect it was prior to the new Act.
For, according to the above dicta, if a man, in
circumstances which made it dear that he did not
intend to imperil another man's life but did intend
to assault that person, were to strike a man with
his fist intending to make his nose bleed or to
blacken his eyes or cause a superficial laceration, or
should hit his hand with a stick and thereby break
a finger, such hurt would constitute a grievous
bodily harm within the Offences Against the Person
Act, 1861, and should death ensue (due to some
unknown constitutional weakness or unexpected
infection) the attacker would be guilty of murder."2
The language of the Court of Criminal Appeal
in the Vickers case stating that where the accused
inflicts grievous bodily harm "he cannot say that
he only intended to cause a certain degree of
harm", certainly seems to suggest some sort of
strict liability for murder of the sort which Mr.
Turner deplores. One can only hope that this
particular sentence was an unguarded dictum by
the court which it will later qualify. Otherwise the
elimination of felony murder by the Homicide Act
will have been more than counter-balanced by the
greater strictness of the approach to the common
law concept of malice. It would perhaps have been
best if the framers of the Homicide Act had undertaken to codify the mens rea of murder and embody
it in the new Act. They preferred to leave the common law undisturbed and to complicate the picture
by their unconventional use of the term "implied
malice". Left with the necessity of discriminating
between express and implied malice in the absence
25 CamrN.AL L. REV. (1958) 27.
2624 & 25 Vict., c. 100.
'CRIMINAL L. REV. (1958) 28-29.

of the felony-murder rule, it is perhaps not surprising that the courts should so readily have buttressed and enlarged the concept of intent to cause
grievous bodily harm. Mr. Turner suggests an
alternative solution, viz. that "express malice"
might be taken to refer to an intention to kill and
"implied malice" to circumstances in which there
was recklessness towards human life without proof
of a desire to bring about death.3 In this way the
mens rea of murder would never lack the essential
constituent of an awareness, a foresight in the
accused of the life-endangering quality of his act.
If it was hoped that this was the principle which
the new Homicide Act would establish in English
law, this expectation has been unhappily defeated
by the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal
in the Vickers case.P
DmrrIsHED

RESPONSIBILITY

§ 2 (1) Where a person kills or is a party to
the killing of another, he shall not be convicted
of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of
mind or any inherent causes or induced by
disease or injury) as substantially impaired
his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.
§ 2 (2) On a charge of murder, it shall be for
the defence to prove that the person charged
is by virtue of thii section not liable to be
convicted of murder.
§ 2 (3) A person who but for this section
would be liable, whether as principal or as
accessory, to be convicted of murder shall be
liable instead to be convicted of manslaughter.
§ 2 (4) The fact that one party to a killing is
by virtue of this section not liable to be convicted of murder shall not affect the question
whether the killing amounted to murder in the
case of any other party to it.
This second section of the Act represents the
official reply to the long standing attacks on the
U2Sbid. at 30.
29The very danger of such a principle as seems to
have been established by the Vickers case was pointed
out by the REPORT OF TuE R.C.C.P., par. 472: "There
is no statutory definition of 'grievous bodily harm' but
it has been held that it need not be permanent or
dangerous but only 'such as sensibly to interfere with
health or comfort'. We find it difficult to believe that
the intentional infliction of such an injury necessarily
involves 'wilful exposure of life to peril'; and we are
therefore disposed to think that it is too wide a criterion
to support a charge of murder."

GRAHAM HUGHES

adequacy of the M'Naghten Rules as a defence.
The M'Naghten Rules in England, at any rate in
the theory of the law, are severe and narrow in
their application. They do not cover irresistible
impulse which the English judiciary has resolutely
30
rejected as an excuse, and the knowledge of
wrongfulness necessary for a conviction is taken to
3
mean mere knowledge of the illegality of the act.
Though juries might take in practice a more lenient
attitude in some casesn the state of the law of
insanity as a defence had not advanced at all from
the time when Lord Bramwell was forced to admit
that "nobody is hardly ever really mad enough
to be within it '"
The Homicide Act does not at all abrogate the
M'Naghten Rules. The Rules are preserved, so
that insanity is as much a complete defence as
before the Act. What the Act does, however, is to
introduce a supplementary doctrine of "diminished
responsibility." Under this doctrine, a "substantially impaired" mind (less than "insanity" under
the M'Naghten Rules) affords a killer a reduction
of his offence from murder to manslaughter. The
doctrine is professedly borrowed from Scottish law
which has applied it since the middle of the nineteenth century. The Scottish doctrine operates at
common law while the English version will of
course be controlled by the statutory language, but
it is highly probable that the English courts will
for some time refer to Scottish decisions for guidance in the application of the concept.34 The nature
of the doctrine as it operates in Scotland is revealed
in the following extracts from leading Scottish
decisions:
"It is very difficult to put it in a phrase, but it
has been put in this way: that there must be aberration or weakness of mind; that there must be
some form of mental unsoundness; that there must
be a state of mind which is bordering on, though
not amounting to, insanity; that there must be a
30See R. v. Kopsch, 19 Cams. APP. REP. 50 (1925).
31See R. v. Codere, 12 Cm. APP. REP. 21 (1916)
and Reg. v. Windle, 36 CRru. APP. REP. 85 (1952).
" The extent to which juries ignored the Rules was
a matter of dispute between experienced witnesses
before the R.C.C.P. See REPORT OF THE R.C.C.P.,
pars. 232-243.
33MiNUms OF EvIDENcE OF SELECT CoMMrITrEE
ON THE HOMIcmDE LAW AMENDMENT BILL, 1874,

Q. 186. Lord Bramwell, however, finished this sentence
by saying that the Rules offered a "logical and good
definition".
4In Reg. v. Dunbar [1957] 3 W.L.R. 330, the Court
of Criminal Appeal in discussing the defence of diminished responsibility relied heavily on the Scottish
decision of H.M. Advocate v. Braithwaite, 1945 J.C.
55.
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mind so affected that responsibility is diminished
from full responsibility to partial responsibilityin other words, the prisoner in question must be
only partially accountable for his actions. And I
think one can see running through the cases that
there is implied.., that there must be some form
of mental disease."36
"It will not suffice in law for the purpose of this
defence of diminished responsibility merely to show
that an accused person has a very short temper or is
36
unusually excitable and lacking in self control."
"The evidence of one of the witnesses was to
the effect that he was inclined to place the accused
in the category of a psychopathic personality ....
The Court has a duty to see that trial by judge and
jury according to law is not subordinated to medical theories; and in this instance much of the
evidence given by the medical witnesses is, to my
mind, descriptive rather of a typical criminal than
of a person of the quality of one whom the law has
hitherto regarded as being possessed of diminished
responsibility."H
So the Scottish doctrine, while couched in broad
and general terms, does seem to demand proof of
some form of mental disease and apparently excludes from its embrace that vague congerie of
misfits who are sometimes called psychopaths.
The Homicide Act, it will be noticed, inserts the
qualification that the "abnormality of mind"
must arise from "a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent
causes" or must be "induced by disease or injury".
The leader of the movement for the abolition of
capital punishment in the House of Commons, Mr.
Silverman, resisted the inclusion of this qualification and it seems probable that its purpose was to
give a ground for the exclusion from the scope of
the section of those whose only manifestation of
disease of the mind is their anti-social behavior.
Once evidence is offered of the kind of abnormality indicated by the section the question is for
the jury. And the question is whether the "mental
responsibility" of the accused was "substantially
impaired". More than perhaps any other question
that a jury is called upon to answer, this is one
that calls for a free emotional response to the total
35H.M. Advocate v. Savage, 1923 J.C. 49, 50-51.
"6H.M. Advocate v. Braithwaite, 1945 J.C. 55, 58.
- Carraher v. H.M. Advocate, 1946 J.C. 108, 117118. Fuller extracts from the Scottish decisions are
R.C.C.P., Appendix 8 (b);
given in REPORT OF =XE
and see T. B. SmiTH. Diminished Responsibility,
CRmNAT L. REV. (1957) 354.
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situation. For responsibility is not a quality inherent in the accused but rather an attribute that is
ascribed to him. The M'Naghten Rules, however
harsh, did offer a structure for rational adjudication; the defence of diminished responsibility does
not even profess to do this but allows the jury a
free exercise of compassion. This of course is not
necessarily a demerit.
The burden of proof here is said by Section 2 (2)
of the Act to be on the defence, as it always was
with the M'Naghten Rules. Under the English
rule this burden is discharged by establishing a
preponderance of probabilities. S"
tMPACT ON THE M'NAGHTEN RULES

A question of great importance, the answer to
which is not at all dear, is the impact which the
new doctrine of diminished responsibility will have
on the working of the M'Naghten Rules. In
theory the Rules are left untouched, but will they
in fact have any real significance in the future?
During the debate in the House of Commons on
the Homicide Act the Attorney-General commented on this point as follows: "I think that the
strict answer to that [i.e., whether the diminished
responsibility doctrine would in fact abrogate the
M'Naghten Rules] is that it will not, but I do not
suppose that many accused persons will put forward a defence of insanity. I should perhaps make
this dear. If the defence raises any question as to
the accused's mental capacity, and evidence is
called to show that he is suffering from a serious
abnormality of mind, then, if the evidence goes
beyond a diminution of responsibility and really
shows that the accused was insane within the
M'Naghten Rules, it would be right for the judge
to leave it to the jury to determine whether the
33Reg. v. Duz;,AR [1957], 3 W.L.R. 330, 333-335.
In Reg. v. Matheson [19581 1 W.L.R. 474, [19581
2 All. E.R. 87, there was unanimous medical testimony
to the effect that the accused was a feeble-minded
psychopath. Nevertheless the jury rejected the defence
of diminished responsibility, no doubt moved by the
revolting circumstances of the killing. The Court of
Criminal Appeal found the jury's verdict to be unsupported by the weight of the evidence and substituted,
as may be done under the English practice, a verdict
of guilty of manslaughter on the ground of diminished
responsibility. This case, decided by a full court, is
of great importance as it shows that a psychopath of
feeble mind may be covered by the defence. In the
earlier case of Reg. v. Spriggs [1958] 2 W.L.R. 162,
it was held by the Court of Criminal Appeal that a
jury had properly rejected the defence of diminished
responsibility where the accused had been described
as of psychopathic personality but was admittedly of
high intelligence. On these cases see Hall Williams,
Note, 21 MODERN L. REV. 544 (1958).

accused was, to use the old phrase, 'guilty but
insane' or to return a verdict of manslaughter on
the basis that, although not insane, he suffered
from diminished responsibility." 31
In England a verdict of "Guilty but Insane",
which is the form used when the M'Naghten Rules
are applied,40 results in the committal of the accused by the court to detention in a criminal
lunatic asylum, detention which may be for a long
period and will sometimes be for life. The possibility held out by the Homicide Act of a conviction
for manslaughter on the ground of diminished
responsibility, followed by a term of imprisonment
of probably not an intolerable length, is clearly
more attractive to the defence. This seems to
raise the horrid prospect that those defendants
with serious mental derangements will under the
new statute be convicted of manslaughter and will
be treated as normal prisoners. Such a lamentable
outcome is, however, unlikely. It can be avoided in
the first place by the power which the judge
possesses of putting the issue of insanity to the
jury in terms of the M'Naghten Rules once the
defence has led any evidence of mental abnormality. And if this power should on occasions fail and
the accused, who is dearly in an advanced state of
mental illness, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for manslaughter, it is still possible to remove
him to a criminal lunatic asylum by a process of
certification.'
But, although the practical outcome may not
be disastrous and is indeed an improvement on
the previously unchallenged M'Naghten Rules,
the state of the law under the new Act is scarcely
elegant. The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, in fact, expressly rejected the device of
diminished responsibility as practised in Scotland,
though on the somewhat curious ground that it
would be too radical an amendment of the law of
England to be justified for such a limited purpose.2
A more cogent objection is surely that the whole
notion of diminished responsibility makes very
little sense. The idea that one may be so mentally
abnormal as not to be accountable for a killing in
the sense that one ought to be sentenced to death,
but yet may remain so accountable as to be sen1254.
The special verdict in this form was created by
S.2 (1) of the Trial of Lunatics Act, 46 & 47 Vict.,
c. 38 (1883).
41These points are made by GRxw, Diminished Re439
0 560 HousE oF CoMaoNs DEBATES,

sponsibility and the Trial of Lunatics Act, 1883, CRrIrNAL L. REV. (1958) 521.
4 REPORT or THE R.C.C.P., par. 413.
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tenced to a term of imprisonment is difficult to
support. This is, of course, exactly the situation
with the doctrine of provocation and what has
now happened in England is that diminished
responsibility has been added to provocation as a
supplementary doctrine of extenuating circumstances which may justify a lesser punishment.
Now the only sense that can be made of the doctrine of provocation is that we are ready to punish
people for not controlling themselves as we think
they should have, but since we are all uncomfortably aware of our own propensities to behave
unreasonably we mitigate the penalty. (This is
not, of course, the conventional justification of the
doctrine but is surely the only one that makes
sense.) Those who are unlucky enough to lose selfcontrol in circumstances which result in their
taking a life must suffer for the sake of communal
expiation. This is a primitive notion and it is now
matched by an identically unhappy and irrational
attitude to those who suffer from mental abnormality. We are now to say that those who are mentally
abnormal may be partially responsible for killing.
We are becoming sensitive enough to be shocked
at the thought of executing them, but are still
insensitive enough to send them to prison. This is
a most uneasy compromise in which society consumes its cake of guilt by tossing morsels in contrary directions. We cannot altogether abandon
talk of punishment; these people are too like us for
us not to punish them. At the same time we cannot
call them murderers and hang them. Again they
are too like us.
The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment
recommended (with three dissentients) that the
best amendment of the law of insanity as a defence
to crime would be a complete abrogation of the
M'Naghten Rules and the submission to the jury
of the general question whether at the time of the
act the accused was suffering from disease of the
mind or mental deficiency to such a degree that he
ought not to be held responsible.4A This recommendation was criticized as leaving the matter in
altogether too vague and imprecise a formula and
it was not pursued. Its unpopularity was no doubt
due to the ruthless way in which it deprives the
unclear mind of the delightful solace of having
things both ways, a comfort which is obviously
the chief attraction of diminished responsibility.
For under the Royal Commission's proposal there
is insistence on the single choice between recogniz43Ibid., par. 790, §15-20.

ing mental abnormality as a matter which removes
the accused from the field of crime and punishment and places him in the category of sickness
and treatment, and, on the other hand, the rejection of the relevance of the mental condition. There
is a lot more sense in this than in the Erewhonian
attitude of the diminished responsibility doctrine
which seems to regard mental abnormality as
something in itself deserving moderate punishment. But, in so far as the new doctrine means
that mentally sick persons who would previously
have been hanged will now be saved in England,
it is, of course, vastly welcome.
PROVOCATION
§ 3 Where on a charge of murder there is
evidence on which the jury can find that the
person charged was provoked (whether by
things done or by things said or by both together) to lose his self-control, the question
whether the provocation was enough to make
a reasonable man do as he did shall be left to
be determined by the jury; and in determining
that question the jury shall take into account
everything both done and said according to
the effect which, in their opinion, it would
have on a reasonable man.
The law of provocation in England, a mitigating
circumstance which reduces murder to manslaughter, had over the last hundred years become
hardened into a series of rigid sub-rules. So it had
become settled that the provocation must be such
that it not only caused the accused to lose his
self-control but would have caused the reasonable
man to lose his self-control" (the folly of punishing people for behaving reasonably apparently not
having been perceived), and again that mere words
cannot amount to provocation. 45 In the operation
of this restricted doctrine the judge played a controlling role. He decided as a question of law
whether the allegations of the defence could
amount to provocation with respect to the reasonable man; the jury's only function was then to
decide, if the questions were put to them, whether
the provocation was in fact enough to act on a
"R. v. Alexander, 9 CaIM. ApP. RE:P. 139 (1913);
R. v. Lesbini [19141 3 K.B. 1116; Bedder v. Director
of Public Prosecutions [19541 1 W.L.R. 1119.
45 Holmes v. Director of Public Prosectutions [1946]
2 All E.R. 124. The House of Lords in this case did
recognize that words alone might amount to provocation in "circumstances of a most extreme and exceptional character", but such a holding was tantamount to excluding them.
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reasonable person and whether the accused did in
fact act under its stress.4 6
The Homicide Act seeks to amend the law by
leaving both questions to the jury and at the same
time removing the restriction that words alone
cannot be an adequate provocation. These are
desirable reforms but it is to be regretted that
the concept of the reasonable man, who seems to
have accidentally blundered into this area of law
where he is not at all at home, should have been
preserved.Y Together with the introduction of
diminished responsibility, this section of the new
Act has considerably broadened the doctrine of
extenuating circumstances in the English law of
homicide.
SUICmE PACTS
§ 4 (1). It shall be manslaughter, and shall
not be murder, for a person acting in pursuance of a suicide pact between him and another to kill the other or be a party to the
other killing himself or being killed by a third
person.
§ 4 (2). Where it is shown that a person
charged with the murder of another killed
the other or was a party to his killing himself
or being killed, it shall be for the defence to
prove that the person charged was acting in
pursuance of a suicide pact between him and
the other.
§ 4 (3). For the purposes of this section
"'suicide pact" means a common agreement
between two or more persons having for its
object the death of all of them, whether or not
each is to take his own life, but nothing done
by a person who enters into a suicide pact
shall be treated as done by him in the pursuance of the pact unless it is done while he has
the settled intention of dying in pursuance of
the pact.
In England suicide is a crime akin to murder.
The consequence of this was that where two persons entered into a suicide pact the survivor
would be guilty of murder as a principal in the
second degree, if he were actually present while
the other committed suicide, or of murder as an
accessory before the fact if he were not present. s
46 See the discussion in Holmes v. D.P.P., supra note
45, at 126.
'7See TURNER, KENNY'S OUTLINES OF CRMNAL
LAW (17th ed. 1958) 157-161.
4 R. v. Croft, 29 Crim. App. Rep. 161 (1944);
REPORT OF THE R.C.C.P., pars. 164-176.

As the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment
put it: "If two thwarted lovers decide to drown
themselves but one is rescued, or if two old people
resolve to end a life of poverty or sickness by
gassing themselves or by taking poison, but only
one of them dies, the survivor is liable to be
charged with and convicted of murder."' '
The Royal Commission proposed that a new
offence of aiding, abetting or instigating suicide
should be created, with a maximum sentence of
imprisonment for life. 0 This would bring the law
into line with practice, which, in such harrowing
cases as those instanced by the Royal Commission,
had always been to commute the death sentence
and to inflict a short term of imprisonment. The
Homicide Act has effected the same result by
treating the abetting or instigating of suicide under a suicide pact as a form of manslaughter, which
in England is an offence' carrying a maximum
penalty of imprisonment for life. It is suggested
that here the statute has taken a course preferable
to that advocated by the Commission. There are
cases where instigation to suicide seems equally
heinous as the more conventional forms of murder.
The Commissioners themselves cite the kind of
case in which "an older man persuades a young
girl pregnant by him to commit suicide and has no
real intention of doing so himself." Under the
statute such cases would remain cases of murder
as there could be no satisfaction of the conditions
demanded by the statute as constituting action in
pursuance of a suicide pact. On the other hand, in
one respect the statute goes beyond the proposals
of the Royal Commission, for the Commission confined its recommendation to the aiding, abetting or
instigating a suicide, while the statute covers the
case of the accused's himself killing the other party
to the pact. For both these reasons the statute
seems to offer a better protection for the genuine
participant in the suicide pact than the proposal
of the Commission.
It will be noticed that the statute does not cover
the ordinary case of the mercy killing or euthanasia in which the one who kills has no intention of
taking his own life. There is still no general doctrine
of mitigation for homicide with consent. The burden of showing that the accused acted in pursuance
of the suicide pact is on the defence. Presumably
4

R.C.C.P., par. 164.
Ibid, par. 173.
51Ibid, par. 168. A fictional instance is to be found
1 REPORT OF THE
0
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this will be a burden of establishing a balance of
probabilities.n
LxABILITY TO DEATH PENALTY

§ 5 (1) Subject to subsection (2) of this
section, the following murders shall be capital
murders, that is to say(a) any murder done in the course or furtherance of theft;
(b) any murder by shooting or by causing
an explosion;
(c) any murder done in the course or for
the purpose of resisting or avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, or of effecting or
assisting an escape or rescue from legal
custody;
(d) any murder of a police officer acting in
the execution of his duty or of a person assisting a police officer so acting;
(e) in the case of a person who was a prisoner at the time when he did or was a party
to the murder, any murder of a prison officer
acting in the execution of his duty or of a person assisting a prison officer so acting;
§ 5 (2) If, in the case of any murder falling within the foregoing subsection, two or
more persons are guilty of the murder, it
shall be capital murder in the case of any of
them who by his own act caused the death of,
or inflicted or attempted to inflict grievous
bodily harm on, the person murdered, or who
himself used force on that person in the course
or furtherance of an attack on him; but the
murder shall not be capital murder in the case
of any other of the persons guilty of it.
§ 5 (3) Where it is alleged that a person
accused of murder is guilty of capital murder, the offence shall be charged as capital
murder in the indictment, and if a person
charged with capital murder is convicted
thereof, he shall be liable to the same punishment for the murder as heretofore.
§ 6 (1) A person convicted of murder shall
be liable to the same punishment as heretofore, if before conviction of that murder he
52Though PmvEzER, op. cit. supra note 1 at 647
thinks it will be a burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. He does not advance any reasons for this
belief but seems to regard a strict burden as desirable
to lessen the chance of fraud. But this seems a heavy
task to place on the defence. The case in which a
suicide pact is genuine is the very case in which the
parties are not likely to make out affidavits or tape
record their intentions.
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has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, been convicted of another
murder done on a different occasion (both
murders having been done in Great Britain).
§ 7. No person shall be liable to suffer
death for murder in any case not falling
within section five or six of this Act.
So the death penalty is now confined to the five
special cases set out in Section 5 (1) and the case
of repeated murders as provided in Section 6 (1).
The preservation of the death penalty in Section
5 (1) is evidently not because of the aggravated
moral condemnation that is thought to attend such
cases, for one may easily imagine cases of poisoning or killing in the course of rape or after a kidnapping which are more revolting than some murders by shooting or in the course of theft. The
criterion for distinction is rather the utilitarian one
that these are felt to be the categories in which the
deterrent power of the death penalty is still necessary to restrain the professional criminal and protect the officers of the law in their ordinary duties.It is easy to understand the feelings of a Government, which was unconvinced of the merits of
abolition, in its efforts to cling on to the noose in
those cases where killing is likely to be the work of
the dedicated criminal; but the discrimination between capital and non-capital murder is perhaps
the most sensitive of all policy questions and there
are grave objections to this solution. Killing in
anger with a gun in circumstances which fall short
of provocation is now to be capital murder, while
a slowly plotted and executed poisoning for financial gain is not to be capital. Of course the power
of the executive to commute the death sentence is
retained and will presumably be exercised in cases
where the application of the death sentence seems
harsh, but one of the chief hopes of a new homicide
statute was that it would largely remove such vital
questions from the discretion of the Home Secretary.
The provision relating to murders in the course
of theft is worthy of special notice. It must, of
course, be understood that this is not a reenactment of felony-murder. The Act speaks of murders
and not killings in the course of theft as being
capital, and thus the mens rea of murder in the
sense of malice aforethought must always be
shown. But we have seen from the Vickers case
what this may in fact amount to. And the nature
5 This seems to emerge from the statements of the
Home Secretary in the House of Commons. See PavEzFR, op. cit supra note 1, 648-649.
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of theft in English law hardly provides any very
satisfactory criterion. Section 5 (5) (e) tells us that
for the purposes of the Homicide Act "theft includes any offence which involves stealing or is
done with intent to steal". It will thus presumably
be confined to larceny and will not include embezzlements or cases of obtaining by false pretences. The reason for applying the capital sentence
to such murders is then supposedly that theft is
the typical crime of the professional criminal and
the preservation of the death sentence is likely to
restrain him in the manner in which he goes about
his work. If this is the rationale it would seem
more logical to have confined the death penalty to
murders in the course of burglary or housebreaking rather than in the course of larcenies generally.
The phrase "in the course or furtherance of
theft" will no doubt raise problems of interpretation. Will it be applied to a murder done while
escaping from the scene of a theft (assuming that
the facts are such that they would not be covered
by Section 5 (1) (c))? The American cases on
4
felony-murder clearly cover such a situation.
Section 5 (2) is particularly difficult to understand. The desire to discriminate, when creating
categories of capital murder, between those who
are truly involved in the capital character of the
murder and those who are not is a laudable one,
but this section does a very poor job of discriminating. As it stands, the criminal who instigates
and plots a murder of a capital kind which is then
carried out by his accomplice is not guilty of
capital murder (though he is of course guilty of
murder), while the criminal, not himself intending
to kill, who uses any force on the victim, will be
guilty of capital murder if the victim is killed by
his accomplice in circumstances which render the
murder capital. To find the second man guilty of
capital murder is justifiable, but the exemption of
the instigator is then clearly not justifiable. This is
merely to encourage the clever abstention from
that degree of involvement which renders the
murder capital. The death sentence here will often
be the penalty for stupidity or chance.
In addition to the five categories of capital
murder set out in Section 5 (1), there is also the
case of repeated murders as specified in Section
6 (1). Why should a second murder especially deserve the death penalty? It cannot be because such
a killer has demonstrated that imprisonment is an
51See e.g. State v. 'McCarthy, 160 Or. 196, 83 P.2d
801 (1938); State v. Metalski, 116 N.J.L. 543, 185 A.
351 (1936).

ineffective deterrent, because this applies to all
murderers. Every killing points to the ineffectiveness of all existing deterrents in that particular
case. Nor can it be because such a man is a particular menace to society in the future; this he may
be but life imprisonment is equally effective for
the protection of society as the death penalty. The
only explanation that makes sense is that here we
have passed outside the utilitarian approach that
characterizes Section 5 (1) and are in the realm of
ethical judgments, the judgment presumably being
that to poison a whole family in one fell swoop is
less reprehensible than to murder them piecemeal.
For to invoke this clause the murders must have
been done on different occasions. This is clearly a
highly vague phrase which may lead to grave
problems of interpretation, but whatever interpretation may be accorded to it, it is scarcely conceivable that it can reflect any rational distinction
in the gravity of the crime which would make the
death penalty peculiarly appropriate.
NEW PUNISHMENT

§ 9 (1). Where a court ... is precluded by
this Part of this Act from passing sentence of
death, the sentence shall be one of imprisonment for life.
The old mandatory sentence of death is thus
replaced in England by a mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment, except in cases of capital murder. Here it must be pointed out that the sentence
of life imprisonment in England has never meant
anything remotely like what it says. Sentences of
life imprisonment are subject to review by the
Home Secretary and the maximum period served
is likely to be fifteen years and is very often much
less than that. Before the Homicide Act, murderers
whose death sentence had been commuted by executive action often served very short terms of
imprisonment.' 5 Under the mechanism of the new
Act it is probable that the average terms actually
served will increase, as murderers in prison may
now include those less likely to command sympathy than those who were reprieved before the
passage of the Act, but fifteen years will no doubt
still be an exceptional and maximum term.
CONCLUSION

The Homicide Act, by curtailing the scope of
murder, has greatly enlarged the area of the
55REPORT OF THE R.C.C.P., pars. 644-646.
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crime of manslaughter in England. By reason of
the Act, verdicts of manslaughter will now be appropriate in cases of diminished responsibility,
suicide pacts, and sometimes in cases which were
formerly ones of felony-murder. Also the scope of
the doctrine of provocation has been somewhat
enlarged, again increasing the possibility of a manslaughter verdict. A difficulty that suggests itself
here is that the judge may sometimes not know on
what ground the jury has returned a manslaughter
verdict. Such information is of the greatest need
on a question of sentencing, and it is perhaps regrettable that, at any rate in the case of diminished
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responsibility, a special form of verdict is not
called for by the statute.-6
By thus enlarging the crime of manslaughter
the harshness of the law of murder has undoubtedly
been tempered. At the same time, in the area of
murder that is left the death penalty has been confined to some special instances. If in many respects the Homicide Act is badly drafted, irrational
and muddled, it is none the less a very welcome
mollification of an unduly severe law of murder.
6 A suggestion made by HALL WaLrAms, Legislalion, The Homiide Act, 1957, 20 MODERN L. REV.
381, 383 (1957).

